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EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities after Centros

Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 11, p. 121, 2001

Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 927048

19 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2006  

Paul Rose

Ohio State University - Moritz College of Law; Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation; Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; FundaciĆ³n Instituto de Empresa, S.L. - IE Business School

Abstract

This paper considers the possibilities for company law convergence in the aftermath of the European Court of Justice's landmark Centros decision. The Centros decision introduces the possibility of regulatory competition among EU Member States for company charters. However, entrenched cultural and political features may dissipate the competitive pressures that would give rise to formal convergence of company law statutes. This paper argues that Member States' statutes are more likely to functionally converge in an effort to effectively compete for new incorporations. This paper also considers the possibility of specialization among EU Member States' statutes. Rather than offering a bundle of corporate goods that attempt to appeal to all businesses seeking to incorporate within a jurisdiction, Member States may attempt to craft their corporate codes and associated regulatory institutions to appeal to certain types of companies or industries.

Keywords: Convergence, EU Company Law, Comparative Corporate Law, Comparative Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G38, G30

Suggested Citation

Rose, Paul, EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities after Centros. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 11, p. 121, 2001; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 927048. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=927048

Paul Rose (Contact Author)

Ohio State University - Moritz College of Law ( email )

55 West 12th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Bocconi University - BAFFI Center on International Markets, Money, and Regulation ( email )

Milano, 20136
Italy

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

FundaciĆ³n Instituto de Empresa, S.L. - IE Business School ( email )

Calle Maria de Molina 12, Bajo
Madrid, Madrid 28006
Spain

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