A Behavioral Analysis of Shanghai Real Estate Prices

37 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2006

See all articles by Christopher K. Hsee

Christopher K. Hsee

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Jean-Pierre Dubé

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Marketing Science Institute (MSI)

Yan Zhang

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: August 28, 2006

Abstract

In a field study, we identified an intriguing inconsistency between real estate developers' desired sales pattern (selling all apartments at the same rate) and the actual sales pattern (selling good apartments faster). We explained this inconsistency with Tversky, Sattath and Slovic (1988)'s prominence principle, according to which buyers, who were in a choice mode, weighed the desirability of floors more heavily than developers, who were in a matching mode when setting prices. We corroborated our explanation with controlled experiments using potential Shanghai homebuyers and actual Shanghai real estate developers as participants. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to relate the prominence principle to a real-world issue in one of the world's most active markets.

Keywords: pricing, prominence, choice, matching, behavioral

JEL Classification: D12, L1, M31

Suggested Citation

Hsee, Christopher K. and Dube, Jean-Pierre H. and Zhang, Yan, A Behavioral Analysis of Shanghai Real Estate Prices (August 28, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=927232 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927232

Christopher K. Hsee (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Jean-Pierre H. Dube

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://gsb.uchicago.edu/fac/jean-pierre.dube

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Marketing Science Institute (MSI) ( email )

1000 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138-5396
United States

Yan Zhang

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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