Contests with Multi-Tasking

WZB, Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2006-14

24 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2006

See all articles by Derek J. Clark

Derek J. Clark

University of Tromso - Norges fiskerihøgskole

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.

Keywords: ontest design, multi-tasking, effort incentives

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Clark, Derek and Konrad, Kai A., Contests with Multi-Tasking (August 2006). WZB, Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2006-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=927427 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927427

Derek Clark (Contact Author)

University of Tromso - Norges fiskerihøgskole ( email )

Tromso, N-9037
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://tidley.nfh.uit.no/homepages/derekc/

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

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