Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 2006
95 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2006
Abstract
This chapter first reviews the economic theory underlying the unilateral competitive effects of mergers, focusing on the Cournot model, commonly applied to homogeneous products; the Bertrand model, commonly applied to differentiated consumer products; and models of auctions and bargaining, commonly applied when a bidding process or negotiations are used to set prices. This chapter then reviews two classes of empirical methods used to make quantitative predictions of the unilateral effects of proposed mergers.
Keywords: antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects
JEL Classification: L41, L13, D43
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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