Financial Management, Vol. 39, Winter, 2010
48 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2006 Last revised: 14 May 2014
Date Written: September 5, 2006
We propose an “M&A activity” hypothesis as a partial explanation for IPO underpricing. When going public during active corporate control markets, managers may take actions intended to safeguard their control. In support of this conjecture, we find that pre-IPO M&A activity directly explains IPO underpricing. We also find that underpricing and ownership dispersion are positively correlated; as are ownership dispersion and the probability of remaining independent. Considering the possibility that some managers take their firms public for the purpose of being acquired, our findings indicate that the positive link between M&A activity and underpricing is not robust for firms that are subjectively viewed as likely targets.
Keywords: Underpricing, Initial public offerings, Merger and acquisitions, Corporate control, Governance
JEL Classification: G24, G30, G32, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Boulton, Thomas Jason and Smart, Scott and Zutter, Chad J., Acquisition Activity and IPO Underpricing (September 5, 2006). Financial Management, Vol. 39, Winter, 2010 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=928464