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The Benefits of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis

23 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2006  

Victor Byers Flatt

University of Houston Law Center; University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law; University of Houston Global Energy Management Institute

Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

This article examines the problems of benefit-cost analysis in our regulatory system and posits that a more nuanced version of the "non-delegation" doctrine (made famous in Schechter Poultry) could improve many of the problems associated with the use of benefit-cost analysis. In particular this article notes that many of the problems with benefit-cost analysis are its use by agencies to make large policy decisions, which could be characterized as legislative. The article also notes that though the "non-delegation" doctrine may appear to be dead or dormant, that a form of it, in separation of powers doctrine, exists in court review of agency action under Chevron analysis. The article notes how Chevron and non-delegation, though from different strand of analysis can be seen as part of one separation of powers continuum.

Keywords: non-delegation, agency, benefit-cost, cost-benefit, separation, executive, legislative, environmental

Suggested Citation

Flatt, Victor Byers, The Benefits of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis (September 2006). U of Houston Law Center No. 2006-W-02 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=929213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.929213

Victor Byers Flatt (Contact Author)

University of Houston Law Center ( email )

4604 Calhoun Road
Houston, TX 77204-6060
United States
713-922-0392 (Phone)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ( email )

Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/details.aspx?cid=1022

University of Houston Global Energy Management Institute ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-6021
United States

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