Buy-Back Contracts and Forecasting Incentives in a Supplier-Retailer Channel

40 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2006

See all articles by Prashant Yadav

Prashant Yadav

Harvard Medical School

Chuck Schmidt

University of Alabama

Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

We consider a supplier of style goods who sells his products through a single retailer. Previous research has shown that there exists a continuum of buy-back contracts which can induce the retailer to order the system optimal quantity. In this paper we show that when forecasting choice is included in the decision space, depending on the forecasting ability of the channel members, only certain buy-back contracts can induce both parties to invest in forecasting. To understand the interrelationships between order quantity coordination and forecasting, we first develop a framework for modeling the existence of different forecasts in a supplier-retailer supply chain. The value of combining these forecasts to yield more accurate demand information is then characterized. We show that when both channel members have the ability to forecast and the cost of such forecasting is not prohibitive, there is a unique equilibrium in which the retailer extracts additional profit. Under varying assumptions on the forecasting capability of both channel members and channel margin, we analyze buy-back contracts that can coordinate the channel.

Keywords: Collaborative Forecasting, Return Policies, Buy-back contracts, Supply Chain Coordination

Suggested Citation

Yadav, Prashant and Schmidt, Charles P, Buy-Back Contracts and Forecasting Incentives in a Supplier-Retailer Channel (September 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=929713 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.929713

Prashant Yadav (Contact Author)

Harvard Medical School ( email )

25 Shattuck St
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Charles P Schmidt

University of Alabama ( email )

Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

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