Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement: From Liberal to Democratic Legitimacy

Philosophical Studies, 2006

53 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2006

See all articles by David A. Reidy

David A. Reidy

University of Tennessee - Department of Philosophy

Abstract

An examination of Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy in light of Waldron and Christiano type objections that it ignores that fact that citizens can and often do reasonably disagree over most anything, including conceptions of justice or constitutional design. I try to defend Rawls's basic intuition by shifting the emphasis from reciprocity in justification to reciprocity of interests. This requires a reformulation of the liberal principle of legitimacy giving what I call a democratic principle of legitimacy.

Keywords: legitimacy, Rawls, pluralism, reasonable disagreement, democracy

Suggested Citation

Reidy, David A., Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement: From Liberal to Democratic Legitimacy. Philosophical Studies, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=932669

David A. Reidy (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee - Department of Philosophy ( email )

801 McClung Tower
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865 974 3255 (Phone)
865 974 3509 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.utk.edu/~philosop

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