33 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2006
Date Written: September 1, 2006
Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.
Keywords: public goods, free riding, laboratory experiments
JEL Classification: H41, C72, C92
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Baker, Ronald J. and Walker, James M. and Williams, Arlington W., Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence (September 1, 2006). CAEPR Working Paper No. 2006-007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=932687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.932687