Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence

33 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2006  

Ronald J. Baker II

Millersville University - Economics

James M. Walker

Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis

Arlington W. Williams

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 1, 2006

Abstract

Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.

Keywords: public goods, free riding, laboratory experiments

JEL Classification: H41, C72, C92

Suggested Citation

Baker, Ronald J. and Walker, James M. and Williams, Arlington W., Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence (September 1, 2006). CAEPR Working Paper No. 2006-007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=932687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.932687

Ronald J. Baker II (Contact Author)

Millersville University - Economics ( email )

Millersville, PA 17554
United States

James M. Walker

Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ( email )

Wylie Hall 105
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2760 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

Arlington W. Williams

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall 105
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
812-855-4564 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

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