The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where Do We Stand after Sony/Bmg and Impala?

28 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2006

See all articles by Gisela Aigner

Gisela Aigner

University of Marburg

Oliver Budzinski

Ilmenau University of Technology

Arndt Christiansen

Bundeskartellamt - German Federal Cartel Office

Date Written: September 28, 2006

Abstract

The recent Impala Judgment by the CFI on the Sony/BMG Decision by the Commission represents the most important ruling on collective dominance since Airtours. We review both the Decision and the Judgment and derive implications for the institutional and substantive development of EU Merger Control. Firstly, Impala introduces an ambitious symmetric standard of proof for prohibition and clearance decisions by the Commission. While alleviating fears of an increasing number of false positives in the aftermath of Airtours, this entails the problem how to deal with cases in which neither the existence, nor the absence of anticompetitive effects can be proven to the required standard. Secondly, Impala represents to some extent a comeback of coordinated effects analysis, further précising the conditions for establishing this kind of anticompetitive effects. Thirdly, the ongoing process of increasing the role of third parties in European Merger Control is fuelled. Additionally, and given the characteristics and the development of the music industry, we criticise a lacking in-depth economic analysis of a potential decrease innovation efficiency as well as an increase in foreclosure effects following the merger.

Keywords: merger control, coordinated effects, standard of proof, music industry, collusion, Impala, Sony/BMG

JEL Classification: K21, L41, L13, L82

Suggested Citation

Aigner, Gisela and Budzinski, Oliver and Christiansen, Arndt, The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where Do We Stand after Sony/Bmg and Impala? (September 28, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=933548 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.933548

Gisela Aigner

University of Marburg ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 24
D-35032 Marburg, D-35032
Germany

Oliver Budzinski (Contact Author)

Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )

Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/wth

Arndt Christiansen

Bundeskartellamt - German Federal Cartel Office ( email )

Kaiser-Friedrich-Straße 16
Bonn, 53111
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/

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