Quasi-Rents, Measurement Costs, Enforceability and Efficient Organizations

14 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2006 Last revised: 13 Jan 2009

See all articles by Leonardo L. Ribeiro

Leonardo L. Ribeiro

Center For Private Equity and Venture Capital Research at Fundacao Getulio Vargas (GVcepe)

Andre C. B. Aquino

University of Sao Paulo - FEARP-USP

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

The paper draws heavily from Williamson and Barzel's theoretical propositions. Firstly it translates the measurement cost approach into a rule of thumb type of diagram and then mix it with the asset specificity approach to explain the choice of organizational arrangement. It thus suggests the possibility of merging both theories into a broader and nonetheless operational one.

Keywords: measurement cost, transaction cost, organizational arrangement

JEL Classification: D23, L14, L22

Suggested Citation

Ribeiro, Leonardo de Lima and Aquino, Andre C. B., Quasi-Rents, Measurement Costs, Enforceability and Efficient Organizations (June 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=934169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.934169

Leonardo de Lima Ribeiro

Center For Private Equity and Venture Capital Research at Fundacao Getulio Vargas (GVcepe) ( email )

Rua Itapeva, 432
8th floor
Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo 01313-902
Brazil
+55 (11) 3281-3459 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cepe.fgvsp.br

Andre C. B. Aquino (Contact Author)

University of Sao Paulo - FEARP-USP ( email )

Av. Bandeirantes, 3900 - Monte Alegre
RibeiĆ£o Preto, 14040-900
Brazil
55 16 3602-4972 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fearp.usp.br

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