A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences

46 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2006 Last revised: 17 May 2010

See all articles by Mariana Blanco

Mariana Blanco

Universidad del Rosario

Dirk Engelmann

University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: May 3, 2010

Abstract

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences, inequality aversion, using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential prisoner's dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. From the data we estimate parameters of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We then use these estimates to test several hypotheses across games. Our data show that results from within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analysis. The inequality-aversion model has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level.

Keywords: behavioral economics, experimental economics, inequality aversion, other-regarding preferences

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Blanco, Mariana and Engelmann, Dirk and Normann, Hans-Theo, A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences (May 3, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=934700 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.934700

Mariana Blanco

Universidad del Rosario ( email )

Bogota
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://mbnet26.googlepages.com/home

Dirk Engelmann

University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics ( email )

Egham, TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

Hans-Theo Normann (Contact Author)

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics ( email )

Duesseldorf
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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