Takeover Laws and Financial Development

52 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Tatiana Nenova

Tatiana Nenova

World Bank, South Asia; World Bank - Policy Unit; Harvard University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2006

Abstract

The issue of an appropriate legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a comparative context across 50 countries. It proposes a methodology to create a detailed index on the most salient features of capital market laws, and illustrates the approach on the case of takeover legislation. The methodology allows better understanding of the impact of laws on markets and development, allows a detailed quantification of a given regulation, in this case takeover market rules, and helps determine relevant policy implications. Specifically, the framework permits the exploration of the effects of individual regulations, their substitutability and interplay, as well as the overall extent of friendliness of the laws to investors, or particular groups thereof (such as minority shareholders), and the links of specialized regulation with the overall legal system. Finally, the study explores the effect of the investor-friendliness of takeover laws on stock market development.

Keywords: Corporate Law, Economic Theory & Research, Investment and Investment Climate, Markets and Market Access, Small Scale Enterprise

Suggested Citation

Nenova, Tatiana, Takeover Laws and Financial Development (October 1, 2006). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4029. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=935491

Tatiana Nenova (Contact Author)

World Bank, South Asia ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

World Bank - Policy Unit ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
(202) 458-9531 (Phone)
(202) 522-2031 (Fax)

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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