Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision

25 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2006

See all articles by Sven Fischer

Sven Fischer

University of Newcastle - Economics

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and both to the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall efficiency are mixed. When provision occurs, only unanimity enhances efficiency. Overall, however, unanimity leads to too many rejections.

JEL Classification: C72, C91, H41

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Sven and Nicklisch, Andreas, Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision (September 2006). MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2006/23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=936154 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.936154

Sven Fischer

University of Newcastle - Economics ( email )

Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

Andreas Nicklisch (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
49 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

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