Is There Rent Sharing in Developing Countries? Matched-Panel Evidence from Brazil

35 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2006

See all articles by Pedro S. Martins

Pedro S. Martins

Nova School of Business and Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Luiz Alberto Esteves

University of Siena; Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG)

Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

We provide evidence about the determinants of the wage structures of developing countries by examining the case of Brazil. Our specific question is whether Brazil's dramatic income and wage differentials can be explained by the division of rents between firms and their employees, unlike in competitive labour markets. Using detailed individual-level matched panel data, covering a large share of manufacturing firms and more than 30 million workers between 1997 and 2002, we consider the endogeneity of profits, by adopting different measures of profits and different instruments and by controlling for spell fixed effects. Our results, robust to different specifications and tests, indicate no evidence of rent sharing. This conclusion contrasts with findings for most developed countries, even those with flexible labour markets. Possible explanations for the lack of rent sharing include the weakness of labour-market institutions, the high levels of worker turnover and the macroeconomic instability faced by the country.

Keywords: wage bargaining, instrumental variables, matched employer-employee data, developing countries

JEL Classification: J31, J51, C31

Suggested Citation

Martins, Pedro S. and Esteves, Luiz Alberto, Is There Rent Sharing in Developing Countries? Matched-Panel Evidence from Brazil (September 2006). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2317, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=936330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.936330

Pedro S. Martins (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Carcavelos
Rua da Holanda, 1
Carcavelos, 2775-405
Portugal

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

Luiz Alberto Esteves

University of Siena ( email )

Siena
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.sitenarede.com/luiz_esteves/home

Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) ( email )

Curitiba, Parana
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://www.sitenarede.com/luiz_esteves/home

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
124
Abstract Views
1,739
Rank
484,735
PlumX Metrics