Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust

53 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2006

See all articles by Giancarlo Spagnolo

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical economic analyses, and discusses the empirical and experimental evidence available, also looking briefly at related experiences of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law enforcement. It concludes with a list of desiderata for leniency and whistleblower reward programs, simple suggestions how to improve current ones, and an agenda for future research. The issues discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs exploit.

Keywords: Amnesty, antitrust, cartels, collusion, corruption, competition policy, corporate crime, deterrence, immunity, leniency, organized crime, snitches, self-reporting, whistleblowers

JEL Classification: K31, K42, L13, L44

Suggested Citation

Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust (August 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5794, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=936400

Giancarlo Spagnolo (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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