Efficient Dynamic Auctions

17 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2006

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics; University of Southampton - Division of Economics

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent, leads to truthtelling in every period.

A leading example of a dynamic allocation model is the sequential auction of a single good in which the current winner of the object receives additional information about her valuation. We show that a modified sequential second price auction in which only the current winner makes a positive payment leads to truthtelling. In general allocation problems, the marginal contribution mechanism continues to induce truthtelling in every period but may now include positive transfers for many agents.

Keywords: Vickrey Auction, Marginal Contribution, Dynamic Allocation Index, Multi-Armed Bandit, Bayesian Learning, Experimentation, Matching

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D43, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso, Efficient Dynamic Auctions (October 2006). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1584, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=936633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.936633

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
Helsinki 00100, 00101
Finland

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
+44 23 8059 3263 (Phone)

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