Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism

Posted: 13 Oct 2006

See all articles by Lars Gaarn Hansen

Lars Gaarn Hansen

Amternes og Kommunernes Forskningsinstitut (AKF)

Frank Jensen

Institute of Local Government Studies

Urs Steiner Brandt

University of Southern Denmark

Niels Vestergaard

Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.

Suggested Citation

Hansen, Lars Gaarn and Jensen, Frank and Brandt, Urs Steiner and Vestergaard, Niels, Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 974-985, November 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=937051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00910.x

Lars Gaarn Hansen (Contact Author)

Amternes og Kommunernes Forskningsinstitut (AKF) ( email )

Nyropsgade 37
Copenhagen, DK-1602
Denmark

Frank Jensen

Institute of Local Government Studies ( email )

Nyropsgade 37
DK-1602 Copenhagen V
Denmark
+45 33145949, ext. 22 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.akf.dk/om_akf_en/medarbejdere/frank_jensen/

Urs Steiner Brandt

University of Southern Denmark ( email )

5000 Odense
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/ansat/usb

Niels Vestergaard

Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark ( email )

6700 Esbjerg
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.sdu.dk/staff/nv

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