Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - an Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

20 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2006

See all articles by Werner Guth

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environment comprising different games which - studied in isolation - yield opposite implications. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the definition of inequality aversion as well as on agents ability to discriminate between games.

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Napel, Stefan, Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - an Indirect Evolutionary Analysis. Economic Journal, Vol. 116, No. 514, pp. 1037-1056, October 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=937074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01122.x

Werner Güth (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

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