Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game Reconsidered

Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias

doi:10.2139/ssrn.937187

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Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game Reconsidered

21 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2006

See all articles by Wolfgang J. Luhan

Wolfgang J. Luhan

University of Portsmouth - Faculty of Business - Department of Economics

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: August 8, 2006

Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Keywords: experiment, dictator game, team behavior, social preferences

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D70

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Luhan, Wolfgang J. and Kocher, Martin G. and Sutter, Matthias, Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game Reconsidered (August 8, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=937187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.937187