Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game Reconsidered

21 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2006

See all articles by Wolfgang J. Luhan

Wolfgang J. Luhan

University of Portsmouth - Faculty of Business - Department of Economics

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 8, 2006

Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Keywords: experiment, dictator game, team behavior, social preferences

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D70

Suggested Citation

Luhan, Wolfgang J. and Kocher, Martin G. and Sutter, Matthias, Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game Reconsidered (August 8, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=937187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.937187

Wolfgang J. Luhan

University of Portsmouth - Faculty of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Portsmouth PO4 8JF
United Kingdom

Martin G. Kocher (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria

Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

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