On Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts

15 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2006

See all articles by Arnold Chassagnon

Arnold Chassagnon

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ)

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to Proposition 2, 3 and 4 in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] suggesting an alternative characterization for high effort equilibria.

Keywords: Non-exclusivity, Insurance, Moral Hazard

JEL Classification: D43, D82, G22

Suggested Citation

Chassagnon, Arnold and Attar, Andrea, On Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts (October 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=938382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.938382

Arnold Chassagnon (Contact Author)

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
05.61.62.85.56 (Phone)
05 61 22 55 63 (Fax)

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics

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Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

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00100 Rome
Italy

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