The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?

13 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2006

See all articles by Jeffrey Lynch Harrison

Jeffrey Lynch Harrison

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Abstract

The messenger model permits competing providers - physicians, hospitals, etc. - to make use of a common agent in their dealings with payers. This article makes the case that the messenger model is either tacitly or inadvertently a don't ask, don't tell policy when it comes to competitor cooperation. In addition, this article presents an economic framework that explains how such a policy may benefit health care consumers. Finally, it is suggested that the don't ask, don't tell policy has created an area of per se legality that precludes an examination designed to distinguish consumer-benefiting practices from those that provide no benefit.

Keywords: antitrust, health care, collusion, efficiency, bilateral monopoly

JEL Classification: K13,K21,L41,L44

Suggested Citation

Harrison, Jeffrey Lynch, The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?. Antitrust Law Journal, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=939030

Jeffrey Lynch Harrison (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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