Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations
29 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2006
Date Written: July 2006
We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures balanced transfers exist that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.
This paper extends the analysis of KSG RWP03-020.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Interdependent Valuations, Multidimensional Types, Economics - Economic and Econometric Theory
JEL Classification: C70, D60, D70, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation