An Examination of the Efficiency of Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms
Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms. Journal of Accounting Research, December, 2007.
46 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2011
Date Written: November 8, 2006
Markets have a remarkable capacity for producing efficient resource allocations when information about relative values is dispersed across economic agents. We explore the use of market mechanisms inside the firm to address a resource allocation problem, and compare the outcome with the first- and second-best solution. Although the market mechanism does not always attain the first-best or even second-best benchmark, it is significantly simpler to implement. Moreover, we identify circumstances under which the losses involved in using a market rather than the optimal second-best contract are negligible.
Keywords: capital budgeting, resource allocation, auctions, simple mechanisms, simple contracts, adverse selection, moral hazard
JEL Classification: J41, D82, M40, M46, L22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation