36 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2006 Last revised: 23 Oct 2013
Date Written: October 10, 2007
In this paper we propose a scheme to control non-point source water pollution that employs subsidies to foster voluntary cooperation among farmers and, in that respect, is aligned with the traditional reliance in US water quality policy on voluntary programs aimed at persuading farmers to use environmentally friendly practices designed to improve water quality (Segerson and Wu, 2006). Unlike other voluntary programs, however, the approach proposed here is incentive-compatible so that compliance with cooperative agreements to abate is the optimal strategy for those who enter voluntarily into them.
Keywords: nonpoint source pollution control, cooperative game theory, noncooperative game theory
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Pushkarskaya, Helen N. and Randall, Alan, A Self-Enforcing Cooperative Agreement for Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement (October 10, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=940670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.940670