A Self-Enforcing Cooperative Agreement for Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement

36 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2006 Last revised: 23 Oct 2013

Helen N. Pushkarskaya

University of Kentucky - Department of Agricultural Economics

Alan Randall

Ohio State University (OSU) - Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics; Ohio State University - Sustainable & Resilient Economy Discovery Theme; The University of Sydney - School of Economics

Date Written: October 10, 2007

Abstract

In this paper we propose a scheme to control non-point source water pollution that employs subsidies to foster voluntary cooperation among farmers and, in that respect, is aligned with the traditional reliance in US water quality policy on voluntary programs aimed at persuading farmers to use environmentally friendly practices designed to improve water quality (Segerson and Wu, 2006). Unlike other voluntary programs, however, the approach proposed here is incentive-compatible so that compliance with cooperative agreements to abate is the optimal strategy for those who enter voluntarily into them.

Keywords: nonpoint source pollution control, cooperative game theory, noncooperative game theory

JEL Classification: C7, D7

Suggested Citation

Pushkarskaya, Helen N. and Randall, Alan, A Self-Enforcing Cooperative Agreement for Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement (October 10, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=940670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.940670

Helen N. Pushkarskaya (Contact Author)

University of Kentucky - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

Lexington, KY 40546
United States

Alan John Randall

Ohio State University (OSU) - Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics ( email )

2120 Fyffe Road
Columbus, OH 43210-1067
United States
614-292-6423 (Phone)

Ohio State University - Sustainable & Resilient Economy Discovery Theme ( email )

Blankenship Hall-2010
901 Woody Hayes Drive
Columbus, OH OH 43210
United States

The University of Sydney - School of Economics ( email )

Rm 370 Merewether (H04)
Sydney, NSW 2006 2008
Australia

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