The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe

49 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2006

See all articles by Morten Bennedsen

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Kasper Meisner Nielsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Finance

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

Previous research initiated by Claessens et al. (2002) has established a value discount of disproportional ownership structures. Due to omitted variables problems it is difficult to provide a causal interpretation of these findings. We provide a thorough analysis of this value discount in a large sample of Western European firms, which strengthens the causal interpretation that the discount is driven by incentive and entrenchment effects. First, we show that the value discount is higher in firms with low cash flow concentration, in family firms, in industries with higher amenity value and in countries with better investor protection. Second, we show that these findings are consistent with the predictions of a theoretical model of incentive and entrenchment effects. Third, we find little empirical evidence for a number of alternative omitted variable explanations, including: protection of private benefits; voting and block premia; low-liquidity discount; and, protection against uninvited takeovers. Fourth, we present the puzzling finding that the value discount is significantly higher in firms with dual class shares than in firms with pyramidal ownership. Fifth, we find no impact of disproportional ownership structures on operating performance. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these findings in relationship to the ongoing process of harmonization of the European capital markets.

Keywords: Ownership Structure, Dual Class Shares, Pyramids, EU company law

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Bennedsen, Morten and Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe (October 2006). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 134/2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=941054 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.941054

Morten Bennedsen (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Kasper Meisner Nielsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Finance ( email )

A4.17 Solbjerg Plads 3
Copenhagen, Frederiksberg 2000
Denmark

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