Origins and Consequences of Child Labor Restrictions: A Macroeconomic Perspective

50 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2006 Last revised: 11 Aug 2022

See all articles by Matthias Doepke

Matthias Doepke

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the positive and normative consequences of child-labor restrictions for economic aggregates and welfare. We argue that even though the laissez-faire equilibrium may be inefficient, there are usually better policies to cure these inefficiencies than the imposition of a child-labor ban. Given this finding, we investigate the potential political-economic reasons behind the emergence and persistence of child-labor legislation. Our investigation is based on a structural dynamic general equilibrium model that provides a coherent and uniform framework for our analysis.

Suggested Citation

Doepke, Matthias and Krueger, Dirk, Origins and Consequences of Child Labor Restrictions: A Macroeconomic Perspective (November 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12665, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=941972

Matthias Doepke (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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