Remaking Italian Capitalism? The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of how to explain institutional change in national political economies. Within an actor-centered institutionalist theoretical framework, it explores the utility of a coalitional explanation for changes in the financial and corporate governance systems of Italy. Finance and corporate governance are useful foci for understanding change and the evolutionary direction of national political economies as a whole because, first, national and European reformers have focused a great deal of their energy on transforming financial market structures and corporate governance and, second, the regulation of finance and corporate governance is increasingly important as a means for states to exert influence over their economies. The paper finds considerable change in Italian capitalism as a result of successful elite reformers, party system changes, and the emergence of a reform coalition. However, change is limited and Italy retains a distinctive model of capitalism.

Keywords: Italy, corporate governance, banking, finance, institutional change

JEL Classification: G30, K20, N20, P52