Remaking Italian Capitalism? The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform
West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 521-548, May 2005
51 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2006 Last revised: 24 Sep 2010
Date Written: May 1, 2005
This article addresses the issue of how to explain institutional change in national political economies. Within an actor-centered institutionalist theoretical framework, it explores the utility of a coalitional explanation for changes in the financial and corporate governance systems of Italy. Finance and corporate governance are useful foci for understanding change and the evolutionary direction of national political economies as a whole because, first, national and European reformers have focused a great deal of their energy on transforming financial market structures and corporate governance and, second, the regulation of finance and corporate governance is increasingly important as a means for states to exert influence over their economies. The paper finds considerable change in Italian capitalism as a result of successful elite reformers, party system changes, and the emergence of a reform coalition. However, change is limited and Italy retains a distinctive model of capitalism.
Keywords: Italy, corporate governance, banking, finance, institutional change
JEL Classification: G30, K20, N20, P52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions
By Gregory Jackson, Martin Höpner, ...
Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany
Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety
By Richard Deeg and Gregory Jackson
Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-American Practice
German Codetermination and German Securities Markets
By Mark J. Roe
An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance
By Gregory Jackson and Martin Höpner
Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance