Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements
American Political Science Review, Vol. 3, No. 101, pp. 573-589, August 2007
Posted: 9 Nov 2006
Abstract
What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the US tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given US power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate, namely that state preferences are indeed partly normative and that international commitments do not just screen states, they also constrain.
Keywords: compliance, international law, International criminal court, rule of law, international commitments
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation