Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration

33 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2006

See all articles by Klaus M. Schmidt

Klaus M. Schmidt

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the pricing incentives of IP holders and compare the equilibrium royalty rates charged by vertically integrated IP holders with those of non-integrated IP holders. We show that under many circumstances non-integrated companies are likely to charge lower royalties than their vertically integrated counterparts. The results of this paper are of special relevance for the analysis of competition in CDMA and WCDMA technology licensing, where some IP holders are not vertically integrated into handset and infrastructure manufacturing, while others are.

Keywords: Complementary patents, licensing, IP rights, vertical integration

JEL Classification: D43, L15, L41

Suggested Citation

Schmidt, Klaus M., Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration (November 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=944169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.944169

Klaus M. Schmidt (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 3405 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 3510 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
284
Abstract Views
1,628
rank
110,087
PlumX Metrics