A License for Protection

5 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2006

See all articles by Morris M. Kleiner

Morris M. Kleiner

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

While other labor market institutions have been in decline for decades, occupational licensing has grown dramatically. This is the product of the great benefits that licensing brings to both license-holders and the government. Members of a licensed occupation benefit because they increase the perception of quality and thus the demand for their services, while at the same time they restrict supply. Government officials benefit from the electoral and monetary support of the regulated, as well as the public image that they are protecting consumers. However, for the public, occupational licensure has many costs and few benefits.

Keywords: occupational regulation, registration, certification, licensure, licensing legislation, economics of licensing, goldfarb, quality control, policy options, morris kleiner

JEL Classification: E24, J58, J59, K23, K20

Suggested Citation

Kleiner, Morris M., A License for Protection. Regulation, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 17-21, Fall 2006 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=944887

Morris M. Kleiner (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs ( email )

and the Industrial Relations Center
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-625-2089 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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