The Inevitability of Marketwide Underpricing of Mortgage Default Risk

18 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2006

See all articles by Andrey D. Pavlov

Andrey D. Pavlov

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Finance Area

Susan M. Wachter

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Department of Real Estate ; University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Abstract

Lenders are frequently accused of mispricing the put option embedded in nonrecourse lending. Prior research shows one lender's incentives to underprice. Here, we identify the conditions for a marketwide underpricing equilibrium. We demonstrate that, in a market with many players, given sufficient time, a race to the bottom and marketwide mispricing are inevitable. Underpricing occurs because bank managers and shareholders exploit mispriced deposit insurance. We show that the probability of the underpricing equilibrium increases with time since the previous market crash and that the more volatile the underlying asset market, the more likely it is subject to underpricing.

Suggested Citation

Pavlov, Andrey D. and Wachter, Susan M., The Inevitability of Marketwide Underpricing of Mortgage Default Risk. Real Estate Economics, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 479-496, Winter 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=944969 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2006.00175.x

Andrey D. Pavlov (Contact Author)

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Finance Area ( email )

Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604 291 5835 (Phone)
604 291 4920 (Fax)

Susan M. Wachter

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Department of Real Estate ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6330
United States
215-898-6355 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~wachter/index.html

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

HOME PAGE: http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~wachter/index.html

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