De Facto Versus De Jure Bank-Insurance Ventures in the Greek Market

Posted: 17 Nov 2006 Last revised: 15 Apr 2010

See all articles by Elena Kalotychou

Elena Kalotychou

Cass Business School, City, University of London

Sotiris K. Staikouras

City University - Cass Business School; ALBA Graduate Business School

Abstract

The present study delves into the bank-insurance phenomenon in Greece. The paper explores the market-based practices surfacing through the bank-insurance interface and delineates the possible theoretical corporate structures. A review of the various financial ventures in the domestic market is provided aiming to unveil corporate patterns both in a cross-venture and time series framework. As a result of this survey, the existence of de jure limits versus de facto boundaries, as expanded by loopholes and avoidance activities, is established. The traditional subsidiary model is complemented by a number of multi-ventures as banks make inroads into the insurance business. The latter is associated with the presence of multinational firms and foreign direct investment in the region. The analysis is further extended by examining the drivers, motives and operational issues pertinent to these financial conglomerates.

Keywords: Bancassurance ventures, Financial Institutions, Insurance markets, Banking industry

JEL Classification: G2, G21, G22

Suggested Citation

Kalotychou, Elena and Staikouras, Sotiris, De Facto Versus De Jure Bank-Insurance Ventures in the Greek Market. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 32, pp. 246-263, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=945437

Elena Kalotychou

Cass Business School, City, University of London ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
Great Britain

Sotiris Staikouras (Contact Author)

City University - Cass Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

ALBA Graduate Business School ( email )

Athinas Ave. & 2A Areos Str.
Vouliagmeni 166 71, Athens
Greece

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