Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?

64 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2006

See all articles by Robert A. Prentice

Robert A. Prentice

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business

David B. Spence

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; University of Texas at Austin – McCombs School of Business – Department of Business, Government & Society; University of Texas at Austin - Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law & Business

Abstract

Recent articles by Romano of Yale, Clark of Harvard, and Ribstein of Illinois have all surveyed the empirical academic literature and found Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) wanting, Romano terming four of its key provisions "quack corporate governance." Using a slightly wider lens and considering an avalanche of more recent work, this article demonstrates that the current dominant view that SOX is wholly unsupported by the academic literature is simply wrong. Rather, that literature gives substantial reason to view some of SOX's most important provisions with a measure of hope.

Suggested Citation

Prentice, Robert A. and Spence, David B., Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?. Georgetown Law Journal, 2007, McCombs Research Paper Series No. IROM-10-06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=945796

Robert A. Prentice (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

David B. Spence

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States

University of Texas at Austin – McCombs School of Business – Department of Business, Government & Society ( email )

2110 Speedway, B6000
CA 5.202
Austin, TX 78705
United States
512-471-0778 (Phone)
512-343-0535 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/dspence/

University of Texas at Austin - Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law & Business ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States

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