Search Profiling with Partial Knowledge of Deterrence

17 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2006

See all articles by Charles F. Manski

Charles F. Manski

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

Consider the choice of a profiling policy where decisions to search for evidence of crime may vary with observable covariates of the persons at risk of search. I pose a planning problem whose objective is to minimise the social cost of crime and search. The consequences of a search rule depend on the extent to which search deters crime. I study the planning problem when the planner has partial knowledge of deterrence. I show how the planner can eliminate dominated search rules and how he can use the minimax or minimax-regret criterion to choose an undominated rule.

Suggested Citation

Manski, Charles F., Search Profiling with Partial Knowledge of Deterrence. Economic Journal, Vol. 116, No. 515, pp. F385-F401, November 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=946516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01128.x

Charles F. Manski (Contact Author)

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