Does Stake Size Matter for Cooperation and Punishment?

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-104/1

11 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2006

See all articles by Martin G. Kocher

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Peter Martinsson

Göteborg University - Department of Economics and Statistics

Martine Visser

Göteborg University

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.

Keywords: experiment, public goods, punishment, stake size

JEL Classification: C72, C91, H41

Suggested Citation

Kocher, Martin G. and Martinsson, Peter and Visser, Martine, Does Stake Size Matter for Cooperation and Punishment? (November 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=946759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.946759

Martin G. Kocher (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria

Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Peter Martinsson

Göteborg University - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden

Martine Visser

Göteborg University ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

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