Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-114

17 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2006

See all articles by Baris Ciftci

Baris Ciftci

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Dinko Dimitrov

Bielefeld University - Institute of Mathematical Economics

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.

Keywords: Banzhaf value, hedonic game, semi-value, Shapley value, simple game, strict core

JEL Classification: D72, C71

Suggested Citation

Ciftci, Baris and Dimitrov, Dinko, Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control (October 2006). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-114, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=948414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948414

Baris Ciftci (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Dinko Dimitrov

Bielefeld University - Institute of Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

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