Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives

9 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2019 Last revised: 1 Apr 2016

See all articles by Paul R. Gregory

Paul R. Gregory

University of Houston - Department of Economics; Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Philipp J. H. Schröder

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1, 2006

Abstract

We posit a rational choice model of dictatorship to explain the tendency of dictators to repress innocent citizens. This model demonstrates that, when the quality of information about regime enemies is low, a rational dictator will knowingly kill and imprison citizens who are not real enemies. We use the formerly secret Stalin archives to test this proposition against the stylized facts of Stalin’s three major repressions.

Keywords: Dictatorial systems, Stalinism, Soviet State and Party archives, NKVD, OPGU

JEL Classification: P00, N44, P26

Suggested Citation

Gregory, Paul R. and Schröder, Philipp J. H. and Sonin, Konstantin, Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives (November 1, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=948667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948667

Paul R. Gregory

University of Houston - Department of Economics ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States
713-743-3828 (Phone)
713-661-1968 (Fax)

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

Philipp J. H. Schröder

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences ( email )

Haslegaardsvej 10
DK-8210 Aarhus, 8210
Denmark

Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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