FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2008-06
56 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2007
Date Written: May 2008
Using a large hand-collected dataset from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.
Keywords: Hedge Fund, Activism, Governance
JEL Classification: G14, G23, G3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brav, Alon and Jiang, Wei and Thomas, Randall S. and Partnoy, Frank, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance (May 2008). Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, p. 1729, 2008; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 139/2006; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-28; FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2008-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=948907