The Poverty of Interpretive Univeralism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory
56 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2006
Over the past few decades, interpretivism, the notion that the only understanding of a phenomenon is that which is subject to an individual's own unique perception, has become prevalent in several major disciplines, law included. In this paper, I argue that this notion is severely misguided. First, I contend that Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish, while purportedly at odds with each other, are in fact united in their views at the basest of levels. The unitary point is that for both, understanding law is equivalent to interpreting law. The relativistic regress that occurs notwithstanding, the work of Wittgenstein cogently asserts that for understanding to occur, there must be some initial meaning given to a phenomenon. I argue that interpretivism ignores this theory. Understanding and interpreting must be distinct activities to preserve the relationship of language to legal justification and to the world.
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