Convex Games with Countable Number of Players and Sequencing Situations

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-119

14 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2006

See all articles by Vito Fragnelli

Vito Fragnelli

University of Piemonte Orientale - Dip. di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate

Natividad Llorca

Miguel Hernandez University

Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

In this paper we study convex games with an infinite countable set of agents and provide characterizations of this class of games.Some difficulties arise when dealing with these infinite games, especially to tackle the vectors of marginal contributions.In order to solve these problems we use a continuity property.Infinite sequencing situations where the number of jobs is countable infinite and the related cooperative TU games are introduced.It is shown that these infinite games are convex and the marginals associated with some orders turn out to be extreme points of the core.

Keywords: Cooperative games, countable number of players, convexity, infinite sequencing situations

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Fragnelli, Vito and Llorca Pascual, Natividad and Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín and Tijs, Stef H., Convex Games with Countable Number of Players and Sequencing Situations (November 2006). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2006-119, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=950501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.950501

Vito Fragnelli (Contact Author)

University of Piemonte Orientale - Dip. di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate ( email )

Via V. Bellini, 25/G
15100 Alessandria
Italy
+39+010+3536838 (Phone)
+39+010+3536752 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mfn.unipmn.it/~fragnell/

Natividad Llorca Pascual

Miguel Hernandez University ( email )

Operations Research Center (CIO)
Avda. de la Universidad, s/n, Torretamarit
03202 Elche, Alicante
Spain

Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche ( email )

Avenida de la Universidad s/n
Elche, Alicante 03202
Spain

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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