Information Cascades: Evidence from an Experiment with Financial Market Professionals

57 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2006 Last revised: 22 May 2022

See all articles by Jonathan E. Alevy

Jonathan E. Alevy

University of Alaska Anchorage

Michael S. Haigh

Standard Chartered Bank

John A. List

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

Previous empirical studies of information cascades use either naturally occurring data or laboratory experiments with student subjects. We combine attractive elements from each of these lines of research by observing market professionals from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in a controlled environment. As a baseline, we compare their behavior to student choices in similar treatments. We further examine whether, and to what extent, cascade formation is influenced by both private signal strength and the quality of previous public signals, as well as decision heuristics that differ from Bayesian rationality. Analysis of over 1,500 individual decisions suggests that CBOT professionals are better able to discern the quality of public signals than their student counterparts. This leads to much different cascade formation. Further, while the behavior of students is consistent with the notion that losses loom larger than gains, market professionals are unaffected by the domain of earnings. These results are important in both a positive and normative sense.

Suggested Citation

Alevy, Jonathan E. and Haigh, Michael Stephen and List, John A., Information Cascades: Evidence from an Experiment with Financial Market Professionals (December 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12767, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=951923

Jonathan E. Alevy

University of Alaska Anchorage ( email )

Anchorage, AK 99508
United States

Michael Stephen Haigh

Standard Chartered Bank ( email )

6 Battery Rd
049909
Singapore
65-8838-7318 (Phone)

John A. List (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States