A Sender-Receiver Framework for Knowledge Transfer

Abstract

Shifts to more distributed forms of organizations and the prevalence of interorganizational relationships have lead to increasing needs for knowledge transfers between entities with asymmetric and incomplete information. Due to such information asymmetry and incompleteness, parties seeking knowledge may not be able to identify qualified knowledge providers, and the appropriate experts may fail to be motivated to engage in knowledge transfers. In this paper, we propose a sender-receiver framework for studying knowledge transfers under asymmetric and/or incomplete information. We outline four types of information structures for knowledge transfers, and focus on the sender-advantage asymmetric information structure and the symmetric incomplete information structure. We develop formal game-theoretical models, show how information incompleteness and asymmetry may negatively influence knowledge transfers, and propose solutions to alleviate these negative impacts. Implications for knowledge transfer research and practice are also discussed.

Keywords: knowledge transfer, knowledge management, incomplete information, asymmetric information, sender-receiver game, game theory

JEL Classification: D82