The Effects of the Standard for Search Warrants

29 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2006 Last revised: 29 May 2012

See all articles by Hugo M. Mialon

Hugo M. Mialon

Emory University - Department of Economics

Sue H. Mialon

Emory University

Date Written: October 1, 2010

Abstract

We analyze the effects of the evidence standard for search warrants in an economic model of crime and search. If the warrant standard is initially below a certain positive threshold, increasing it actually reduces crime as well as searches. Moreover, the positive threshold is higher if searches are more preventive. If the warrant standard is initially high enough, increasing it tends to increase crime and reduce wrongful searches. However, if the police do not care too much about whether or not they search the innocent, increasing the standard also increases effort by the police to gather initial evidence non-invasively before seeking to perform invasive searches. Thus, increasing the standard might not greatly increase crime because greater police effort tends to reduce crime; but it might significantly reduce wrongful searches because greater police effort directly increases the accuracy of the police's initial evidence. The results provide efficiency arguments for a right against unreasonable searches.

Keywords: Crime, Police, Evidence, Search, Law, Effort, Efficiency.

JEL Classification: K4, H1, D8

Suggested Citation

Mialon, Hugo M. and Mialon, Sue H., The Effects of the Standard for Search Warrants (October 1, 2010). Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=952189 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.952189

Hugo M. Mialon (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Sue H. Mialon

Emory University ( email )

Department of Economics
1602 Fishburne Dr.
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-712-8169 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.suemialon.net

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