Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in Reits

33 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2006

See all articles by Zhilan Feng

Zhilan Feng

Union College

Chinmoy Ghosh

University of Connecticut - Department of Finance

C. F. Sirmans

Florida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 30, 2006

Abstract

We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find the REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.

Keywords: Director compensation, Nomination Committee, CEO involvement, Real Estate Investment

JEL Classification: G1, G3

Suggested Citation

Feng, Zhilan and Ghosh, Chinmoy and Sirmans, C. F., Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in Reits (October 30, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=952551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.952551

Zhilan Feng

Union College ( email )

Schenectady, NY 12308-3151
United States

Chinmoy Ghosh (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut - Department of Finance ( email )

School of Business
2100 Hillside Road
Storrs, CT 06269
United States
860-486-3040 (Phone)
860-486-0349 (Fax)

C. F. Sirmans

Florida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law ( email )

Tallahasse, FL 32306
United States
850 644-4076 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.fsu.edu/rmi

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