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https://ssrn.com/abstract=953122
 
 

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On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law and Economics


Avishalom Tor


Notre Dame Law School; University of Haifa - Faculty of Law


Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 163

Abstract:     
Sloof et al.'s [2006] elegant study of default breach remedies illustrates both the potential and limitations of experimental law and economics (ELE). Potentially, the rigorous methodology of experimental economics can provide fully controlled tests of relationships among legally significant variables. Human behavior is context-dependent, however. The validity of ELE would therefore be limited if it were, for example, to disregard legal institutions and context in an automatic adherence to all conventions of experimental economics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: experimental law and economics, behavioral law and economics, institutions

JEL Classification: C90, C91, K00, K12


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Date posted: December 22, 2006 ; Last revised: January 11, 2009

Suggested Citation

Tor, Avishalom, On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law and Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 163. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=953122

Contact Information

Avishalom Tor (Contact Author)
Notre Dame Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
United States

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )
Mount Carmel
Haifa, IN IN 31905
Israel
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