Discriminatory Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains: A Rational Expectations Approach to EU Membership Accession

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 568-587, August 2007

39 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2006 Last revised: 24 Oct 2011

Thomas Pluemper

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics; University of Essex - Department of Government

Christina J. Schneider

University of California, San Diego; Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: December 20, 2006

Abstract

Conflicts between EU members about enlargement result from its re-distributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing-in membership rights serves to compensate the opponents of enlargement in order to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.

Keywords: EU, Enlargement, Conflict, Discrimination, Membership

JEL Classification: P17, P34, F43

Suggested Citation

Pluemper, Thomas and Schneider, Christina J., Discriminatory Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains: A Rational Expectations Approach to EU Membership Accession (December 20, 2006). Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 568-587, August 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=953124

Thomas Pl├╝mper (Contact Author)

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics ( email )

Vienna
Austria

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.polsci.org/pluemper

Christina J. Schneider

University of California, San Diego

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

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