Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets

41 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2006 Last revised: 7 Dec 2022

See all articles by Fernando Broner

Fernando Broner

CREI; Barcelona GSE; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; CEPR

Alberto Martin

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jaume Ventura

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of sufficient default penalties, sovereign risk constrains credit and lowers welfare. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Once this assumption is relaxed, there is always an equilibrium in which sovereign risk is stripped of its conventional effects. In such an equilibrium, foreigners hold domestic debts and resell them to domestic residents before enforcement. In the presence of (even arbitrarily small) default penalties, this equilibrium is shown to be unique. As a result, sovereign risk neither constrains welfare nor lowers credit. At most, it creates some additional trade in secondary markets. The results presented here suggest a change in perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. To argue that sovereign risk constrains credit, one must show both the insufficiency of default penalties and the imperfect workings of secondary markets. To relax credit constraints created by sovereign risk, one can either increase default penalties or improve the workings of secondary markets.

Suggested Citation

Broner, Fernando and Martin, Alberto and Ventura, Jaume, Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets (December 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12783, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=953206

Fernando Broner (Contact Author)

CREI ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner

Barcelona GSE

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom
+34 93 542 2601 (Phone)

Alberto Martin

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Jaume Ventura

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States