Assortative Matching and the Education Gap
Borradores de Economia Working Paper Series
36 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2006
Date Written: December 2006
Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the first stage agents choose their education level and in the second they participate in the labor and marriage markets. Competition among potential matches ensures that the efficient education levels can always be sustained in equilibrium, but there may be inefficient equilibria. Combining asymmetries intrinsic to the modelled markets the model reproduces the observed education gap.
Keywords: Assortative matching, pre-marital investments, efficiency, gender
JEL Classification: C78, D13, D61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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